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CHIN A IN THE WAR 
BY CARROLL K. MICHENER 
IT is generally conceded that at the be-ginning of the Great War the political 
integrity of China, the commercial Open 
Door, and the general peace of the Far East, 
were most threatened. by two aggressors-
] apan and Russia. The first two years 
of the war emphasized this danger. Two 
notable recent events, however, have put a 
radically different complexion on Far East-
ern affairs, and placed the future of China 
on a more promising basis than it has ever 
stood before. These events are the democ-
ratization of Russia and the alignment of 
China with the Allies in th~ir war against 
Germany. 
The significance of these happenings in 
their relation to the affairs of the Far East 
seems to have been more or less overlooked 
in our intense preoccupation with the nearer 
aspects of the war. But their effect must 
be far-reaching, and eventually will be ap-
parent, not only as shaping China's destiny, 
but in the solution of the Orient's complex 
problems. 
The effect of the changes in Russia as they 
touch China is, of course, subject only to 
speculation, but the probable res_ults of 
China's entrance into the war seem so ob-
vious as to wa'rrant pretty liberal estimation. 
Both, it may be safely said, will have their 
share in lifting China to a more powerful 
·and honorable place among her sister na-
tions. 
PROBABLE GAINS FROM THE WAR 
China stands to gain far more than she 
might lose by the war. The balance is al-
most wholly in her favor. In it are to be 
reckoned her hope of release from the stag-
gering indemnities inherited from the Boxer 
trouble, probable relief from foreign restric-
tions that keep her import duties at an un-
profitable level, restoration of sovereignty 
over territorial concessions wrested from her 
in her greatest hours of weakness, more gen-
erous cooperation in developing her natural 
resources, and a more certain guarantee of 
her democracy and her political integrity. 
Participation in the war gives China a 
• double leverage for the attainment of the 
last-named of these potential benefits. It 
will operate both internally and externally. 
The recent monarchical restoration of Gen-
eral Chang Hsun served to emphasize the 
lack of cohesion that threatens China with-
in. It was followed by continued rumblings 
of southern secession, which persisted up to 
the moment of declaring war on Germany. 
At any time China might have burst into 
the flame of a civil strife between the radical 
South and the reactionary North. The fac-
ing of a national enemy should be, as al-
ways, a powerful agent for quieting this in-
ternal dissension and for putting China's 
quarreling patriots shoulder to shoulder. 
The external safeguard of the Chinese de-
mocracy resides, of course, in the benevolent 
protection assured by the family of Allied 
nations. 
RUSSO-JAPANESE AGREEMENT 
The danger to China's integrity from 
predatory neighbors has been acute for over 
a century. Though most of the European 
powers have had their share in a policy of 
plundering that seemed certain a decade and 
a half ago to result in the "break-up of 
China" that more than one authority on Far 
Eastern affairs predicted, Russia and Japan 
always have been the most threatening to 
her political entity. Both are imperialistic. 
The Russo-] apanese war was an incident 
that outlined China's danger to the full, 
though on the surface it may have seemed 
a negative sort of protection to her. Out of 
that comparatively indecisive struggle grew 
recognition between Japan and Russia of 
the compatibility-in spite of the similarity 
of their imperialistic aims. They found that 
cooperation, rather than altercation, was 
what would best advance their mutual in-
terests. 
At the beginning of the Great War, then 
-just ten years after the siege of Port Ar-
thur-Japan and Russia had come to an 
agreement that held the utmost danger for 
China. Between them they had parceiled 
out Manchuria and Mongolia, and agreed 
upon harmonious means of exploiting their 
spheres of influence. Russia retained in ef-
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feet what she had fought for in 1904-gen-
erous commercial advantage in China and 
a sea outlet in the Eastern hemisphere. J a-
pan insured what in effect she fought for-
and which nominally had been very largely 
wrested from her by the treaty of Ports-
mouth-an outlet on the continent of Asia 
for her surplus population, and plenty of 
commercial elbow-room. 
JAPAN'S OVERLORDS HIP 
Enlargement of these advantages through 
the Russo-] apanese rapprochement had been 
observed by the other powers prior to the 
Great War, and it is aoubtful if the process 
could have gone to much greater length with-
out an accounting. The war, however, and 
the alignment of Japan and Russia in the 
Entente group, removed all restraining 
fingers. In wresting Kiaochow from Ger-
many Japan took liberties with China's 
sovereignty that seemed to evidence a feel-
ing on her part that she was free to go al-
most as far as she liked. This apparent senti-
ment was demonstrated further in the fa-
mous twenty-one demands, and not many 
months ago in the concessions insisted up-
on as indemnity for a petty clash between 
Japanese military police and Chinese resi-
dent troops in northern China. Japan has 
taken over in full Germany's former in-
terests in China, and such of the twenty-
one demands as met with compliance have 
given her vastly increased commercial and 
political influence over h~r neighbor. The 
result may be summed up, so far as China 
is concerned, as the conversion of China in-
to what gave ominous promise of a future 
vassal state, and as the virtual overthrow-
so most observers in the United States have 
viewed it-of the Open Door policy. 
RUSSIAN POLICY 
With imperialistic Japan in full agree-
ment with imperialistic Russia, and the aims 
of both in the Far East beng carried out 
energetically by Japan during the fortuitous 
"open season" occasioned by the occupation 
of the rest of the powers in the world war, 
the Russian revolution offered curiously new 
possibilities. Would the sudden change from 
autocracy to democracy effect changes in 
Russia's policies that would reach as far as 
China? Could the pronouncement of the 
infant Muscovite democracy that it would 
continue the war for liberties and not for 
conquests be taken as an indication that the 
new Russia would strive no further for em-
pire in the East? Might China not only 
be safe from further territorial aggression 
by her neighbor on the north, but even re-
gain from the sister democracy what the old 
autocacy had taken while China was in the 
throes of her own emancipation? These 
questions, of course, are not yet answered, 
but they offer hopeful possibilities. They 
are questions to which China's entrance in-
to the war may insure the most satisfactory 
answers. 
China at war with Germany on the side 
of the Allies is an astoundingly different fig-
ure from anything she has ever before pre-
sented to the modern world. Even though 
her participation in the war may be only 
nominal, her position would be hardly less 
strong for that. It is the outcome of the 
boldest and most farseeing bit of statecraft 
the young republic has written into her his-
tory. In a word, she places herself and her 
destiny at a council table the nature of which 
insures to her oy moral force alone the jus-
tice and security she might otherwise have 
gained only by recourse to arms against na-
tions with which she now is allied. 
WRITING OFF BOXER INDEMNITIES 
The world at large scarcely realizes, per-
haps, what a revenge is wreaked upon the 
Chinese people through the staggering in-
demnities exacted in punishment for the 
fanatical outburst of 1901. Though orig-
inally the Boxer indemnity reached a total 
of only $335,000,000, it has grown through 
deferred interest payments to almost twice 
that sum. Many millions of the debt have 
been paid, but the sum owing to-day is about 
$550,000,000, which is an exceedingly heavy 
burden for a nation whose annual budget 
runs to scarcely more than $200,000,000. 
Although Germany took small part in the 
relief of the Boxer-besieged legation at 
Peking, her troops arriving after everything 
was over except the looting, her portion of 
the indemnity was larger than that of any 
other nation except Russia, whose troops did 
least in the restoration of order. Germany's 
shar.e was $110,000,000, most of which is 
unpaid. Here, then, is an opportunity for 
China to be rid promptly of one of the dan-
gerous drains upon her financial vitals. 
Declaration of war against Germany at once 
strikes off a debt of a least a hundred odd 
millions. As for the rest of the indemnity, 
is it a vain hope that the reward of the Al-
lies for China's enlistment in their cause 
should be complete remission of payment, or · 
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at the very least an indefinite deferment as 
to both principal and interest? 
The example of the United States in con-
verting her share of the indemnity into a 
fund for the education of young Chinese in 
schools and colleges of America has been 
looked upon in late years by the other powers 
with a respect almost amounting to Jealousy. 
China counts upon this shrewd example, 
doubtless, to bring equal, if not greater, con-
cessions from the nations that now are her 
allies. And if -the chancelleries of Europe 
understand China-as they must pretty well 
at this advanced stage of diplomatic experi-
menting upon her-they understand that it 
is not the money alone that irks China; that 
probably the money is the very least of the 
burden. It is the ignominy undeservedly in-
herited from old China that stings the young 
Chinese. The Boxer indemnity for them is 
loss of "face"-a badge of servitude as bitter 
as the shameful queue of the Tartars. 
DISCRIMINATIONS AGAINST CHINESE SOV-
EREIGNTY 
Increasing the weight of the indemnity 
burden, the restricted import duty imposed 
upon China by the meddling powers has 
been another financial incubus. Though the 
5 per cent. impost was fixed over a decade 
ago, and even then was inadequate to meet 
China's revenue needs, she never was able to 
get the unanimous consent of all the powers 
to increase it. China hopes, by entering the 
war, to remedy not only this but other fi-
nancial disabilities, and to gain release from 
the more irksome of the fiscal supervision im-
posed upon her by creditor nations. 
The young China has chafed sorely at her 
inheritance of foreign police and law courts 
from those recent barbaric days when they 
admittedly were necessary. The outright 
concessions or long-term leases of land for 
trading purposes and as war indemnities, 
some of them dating back over half a cen-
tury, are severe thorns to-day in the side of 
the young republic. What happened to the 
foreign concessions many years ago in Japan 
must happen in China eventually, but the 
powers have not been noticeably disposed to 
act on their own initiative. Their course 
would have been to wait until China was 
strong enough politically to compel restora-
tion of her alienated soil to the sovereignty 
of her own flag. This political strength 
seems assured to her in the place she will 
hold at the war council-table of the Allies. 
Particularly humiliating have been some of 
the foreign colonies planted on Chinese soil. 
They have become more pernicious parasites 
on China's sovereignty than ever Japan had 
to deal with. Germany's seizure of Kiao-
chow was a flagrant example. Here as in 
all the foreign concessions, was planted a 
foreign flag, foreign courts, a foreign army. 
From the firm entrenchment of Tsingtau, 
Germany reached out by means of railroad 
enterprises until practically the entire prov-
ince of Shantung was in her grasp. This 
was true to greater or less extent with all 
the foreign concessions, each of which was 
an open and spreading wound to China's 
sovereignty. The British entrenched them-
selves at Hongkong and Wei-hai-wei, the 
French in Kuangchouwan, the Portuguese 
at Macao, the Japanese in Formosa and 
Kuantung ; and each of these and other na-
tions had gained smaller slices of territory in 
nearly a dozen treaty ports up and down the 
coast and far inland. 
FOREIGN TROOPS AT PEKING 
Most · exasperating to the young China of 
all the extra-territoriality, perhaps, is the 
presence, a decade and a half after the Boxer 
uprising, of thousands of foreign troops un-
der the very eaves of the gilded roofs of the 
C'1.pital, guarding the legations and the line 
of approach to the sea. The world had al-
most forgotten this arrangement in the recent 
days when the dramatic burlesque of General 
Chan's attempted restoration of the Manchu 
dynasty suddenly called it to mind. It was 
rather surprising to read the news cables that 
chronicled renewed marches of protective 
foreign troops along the railway leading 
from Tien-Tsin to Peking. China would 
have all this remedied, either by tacit agree-
ment now or by promised council after the 
war. She would have the flag of the republic 
flying over all of China, · and her new law 
courts and police power governing the for-
eigner as well as the native within her gates. 
THE KAISER'S MAILED FIST IN CHINA 
Opportunity for the seizure of Kiaochow, 
which had long been contemplated, was af-
forded to the Kaiser by the murder of two 
German missionaries in Shantung province. 
The Berlin Government immediately in-
structed its minister at Peking to demand 
of the Chinese Government the cession • of 
Kiaochow Bay and its adjacent territory. 
Before China had time to answer the Ger-
man note, four German cruisers suddenly 
appeared in Kiaochow Bay and landed a 
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large detachment of marines. Since China 
could not fight she could do no less than 
sign the "murder convention." Though the 
murders were the pretext, the real reason for 
the seizure, of course, was that German 
trade expansion in China demanded advan-
tages no less great than those other Euro-
pean nations had acquired long before the 
development of Germany's colonial policy. 
Since the seizure of Kiaochow, China has 
had occasion often enough to observe the 
operation of the mailed fist. In treatment 
both of officials and individuals-particularly 
the common people who happened to be in 
the way-Germany has been ruthless and ar-
rogant. What China considered the great-
est humiliation visited upon her as punish-
ment for the Boxer uprising against for-
eigners was Germany's demand of an im-
posing monument in a conspicuous place in 
Peking bearing a perpetual apology for the 
murder of the German ambassador. Though 
the German troops arrived late at the relief 
of Peking, they were not too late for blood-
shed and looting. Order had been restored, 
but the German troops came inland to 
Peking in a procession of sabotage and mur-
der according with the orders for "frightful-
ness" that had gone out from Potsdam. 
INFLUENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 
As for a direct cause of war China 
had, perhaps, less grievance than any other 
belligerent. Having no commerce under her 
flag on the high seas she has not suffered 
greatly as a result of the German submarine 
policy. She can point, however, to the loss 
of two hundred Chinese lives on board a 
British vessel torpedoed in the Mediter-
ranean, and though China has not always 
valued the lives of her citizens highly or 
given even passable protect~on for them 
abroad, she no doubt feels that as direct 
causes of war go the loss of her two hun-
dred would be ample. 
But above all the impelling motives and 
influences leading China into the struggle 
stands doubtless the initiative of the United 
States. The sympathy between these two 
nations because of like ideals and fortuitous 
policies of the United States that have bound 
them together in spite of an occasional error, 
is so well understood as to need no restate-
ment. The leadership of America in political 
ideals has been particularly pronounced dur-
ing the period of the war leading up to the 
United States' break with Germany. Utter-
ances of the press and of official China in-
dicated throughout that the Far Eastern re-
public gave full endorsement to the war poli-
cies of the United States. President Wil-
son's note to neutrals at the time of the 
break with Germany was a cue that China 
picked up promptly. Without a "by-your-
leave" to her self-appointed mentor, Japan, 
China broke off relations with Germany as 
the United States had done. There was 
evident at the same time a disposition to go 
even further, should the United States 
again take the lead. In fact, not long after 
America's declaration that a state of war 
with Germany existed the Chinese cabinet 
determined to follow suit. A quarrel with 
Parliament over the right of initiative in the 
matter blocked a formal declaration at that 
time, although all parties are said to have 
been agreed upon the wisdom of the war 
policy. 
jAPAN 1 S RESPONSIBILITY IN CHINA SHIFTED 
TO THE ALLIES 
In the future relations of Japan and 
China as a result of China's participation in 
the war, there is a field for interesting specu-
lation. From this viewpoint alone, China 
seems to have made a master play. There is 
no doubt that China has feared Japan more 
than any other nation. She has had cause for 
such fear. Japan's modern armies have hum-
bled her in military encounter, and Japan's 
might everywhere and always has been 
made apparent to China; for many years her 
mailed fist, like Germany's, has been at 
China's nose. Since the beginning of the 
European war that fist has shaken more 
ominously, and, bowing to the inevitable, 
China long since began making the best she 
could of the situation. The Tsingtau affair 
added to her troubles because instead of being 
relieved of one of the foreign aggressors up-
on her soil she merely experienced a change 
of tenartts. Japan promises to be even a 
sharper thorn at Tsingtau than was Ger-
many. Not only at Kiaochow, but through-
out China, commercially and politically, has 
Japan appeared to be administering an active 
tutorship leading further and further toward 
virtual suzerainty. 
But now, of a sudden, China puts a 
totally new and interesting aspect on the 
case by her entrance into the war. In 
effect she transfers responsibility of main-
taining political integrity from her own 
shoulders to the collective shoulders of the 
Allies. At one stroke she removes Japan 
as chief arbiter of her destinies, and substi-
tute 
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tutes practically the entire civilized world. 
The Allies, who were too busily at war, 
and the United States, whose perplexities 
at home and abroad made her seem indiff er-
ent to the fate of China, now are brought 
back to their duty by a simple shuffling of 
the cards-China's new deal. 
RESTORATION OF THE OPEN DOOR 
America's foreign policy, so far as we can 
be said to have a policy concerning the Far 
East, has been centered about the -Open 
Door. With Germany's commercial inter-
ests in China after the war governed by 
what doubtless will be the severe after-the-
war commercial program of the Allies, 
Japan will be the greatest gainer. Her 
commercial future in China is assured. Re-
moving Germany as a trade competitor in 
the · Far East will relieve the commercial 
pressure sufficiently, perhaps, to restore 
automatically the Open Door which has ap-
peared to be in great danger of being pad-
locked shut through the activities of Japan. 
CHINA'S WEIGHT IN THE WAR 
Curiously enough it will make no great 
difference, in the strategic gains that will 
result for China, whether she contributes 
much or little in waging the war against 
Germany. Her aid will be largely in moral . 
and potential force. Little if anything can 
be expected of China in a military way. 
She has no navy, and though there are in 
China upwards of half a million men under 
arms, they are neither trained nor equipped 
for warfare of the sort that is waged at the 
present day. As for men she has the greatest 
store of any nation in the world. Perhaps 
100,000 already have been sent to France to 
replace in fields and factories the men needed 
at the front. Doubtless many hundreds of 
thousands more will go to fill similar indus-
trial gaps in the ranks of the Allies. 
China's natural resources are enormous. 
Her coal and iron should be of immediate use 
to the Allies. A single one of her iron mines, 
in Hupeh province, will yield, it is estimated, 
5,000,000 tons of ore. There are foundries 
and smelters at Hanyang on the Yangtze 
River that turn out 500,000 tons of steel an-
nually. China's annual output of coal is only 
about 6,000,000 tons, but she has coal re-
sources of about 135,000 acres. The weight 
of China as a belligerent, therefore, even 
though she never fires a shot, and the ponder-
ance of the questions she brings into due 
course of solution at the end of the war, are 
such as will bulk largely in the scales that 
shall weigh the world's peace. 
JAPAN, CHIN A, AND THE 
FAR EAST 
BY K. K. KAWAKAMI 
T HE year 1917 has been a year of puzzles and surprises. -Within the first six 
months events as dramatic as they were unex-
pected followed one after another in such 
rapid succession that even the extraordinary 
three years that preceded them seem to have 
become comparatively commonplace. Since 
the dawn of the year we have seen the over-
throw of the Romanoff dynasty, followed by 
the advent of the new Republic of Russia. 
We have also seen America breaking loose · 
from her traditional foreign policy and deter-
mined to play an important role in the war 
of Europe. To China, however, ci:edit is due 
for having ' furnished the greatest of great 
surprises. That country of eternal enigma 
has set the world agog by an attempt to re-
vive the defunct Manchu dynasty, and this 
at the very moment when Russia threw the 
imperial regime overboard. 
JAPAN AND RUSSIA 
In such sudden turns of events in Russia 
and China, Japan, responsible for the preser-
vation of peace in the Orient, while the 
powers of the West are engaged in the titanic 
struggle, is perhaps more keenly interested 
than any other country. Japan realizes the 
seriousness of the responsibility she has as-
sumed in the Far East, and watches with the 
gravest concern the developments of the 
situation in both Russia and China. 
When I stopped at Tokio en route to 
Peking, the statesmen of Japan were frankly 
puzzled as to the course their country might 
be called upon to take, should disorganization 
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in Russia grow so disastrous as to compel her 
to drop from the ranks of the Entente powers 
and conclude a separate peace with Germany. 
Japan, though six thousand miles distant 
from Petrograd, is nevertheless 'Russia's 
next-door ·neighbor, and is in a position to 
bring pressure to bear upon the Muscovites 
once they are inclined to secede from the 
Entente camp. I was given to understand by 
the statesmen I interviewed that should 
Russia grasp Germany's hand and pursue a 
common course with the latter Japan would, 
if requested by her allies, throw her army 
across the Japan Sea and compel Russia to 
divert her forces from the European field of 
battle to the Far East. But what would be 
Japan's line of action in case Russia simply 
stopped fighting against Germany and took 
no aggressive steps against England and 
France? To this question I was unable to 
get any definite answer. All would perhaps 
depend upon the disposition of the powers 
with whom Japan is cooperating. 
ACTIVE AID TO THE ALLIES 
That the Terauchi Cabinet is willing to 
aid England and France more than is re-
quired in the provisions of the Anglo-
Japanese alliance is indicated by the great 
activities of Japanese warships in the Medi-
terranean Sea as well as in the Indian Ocean 
and the Red Sea. To emphasize that willing-
ness Japan }ias even sent a special embassy 
to America ostensibly for no other purpose 
than that of assuring the latter nation that 
she is ready to take care of the entii:e Pacific 
Ocean if the American navy finds it necessary 
to transfer its Pacific fleets to the Atlantic. 
JAPAN'S ALTERED CHINESE POLICY 
With the woe and weal of China, Japan's 
concern is more direct. The slogan of the 
Terauchi Cabinet with regard to that un-
fortunate country has been "Hands off 
China!" The cabinet was indeed organized 
to reverse the Chinese policy followed by its 
predecessor, the Okuma ministry. The 
Okuma Cabinet, perhaps misled by the ill-
advised counsel of the so-called China ex-
perts, made grave blunders in its dealings 
with China. It resorted to doubtful means 
in preventing Yuan Shih-kai's enthronement. 
It presented to China the celebrated twenty-
one demands in a manner objectionable both 
to China and the outside powers. Moreover, 
some of those demands should better have 
been withheld. To make the situation more 
intolerable, the same ministry reopened the 
wound it had already inflicted upon China J nab 
. by presenting fresh demands on the occasion :hina 
of the little fracas which took place between uesti 
Japanese and Chinese troops at Cheng-Chia-
tun, Manchuria. In fairness to Marquis 
Okuma, I am willing to concede that he be-
lieved his Chinese policy to be the best that 
could be found under the circumstances 
which he had to contend with. Yet judged 
from the results that policy was a grievous nm1 
failure. tand 
1ese p' 
"WATCHFU L WAITING" IN CHINA ,vhen ' 
There is no doubt that the Terauchi Cabi- orial 
net is enjoying the fruits of the Chinese nto t 
measures for which Okuma and his col- ihat 
leagues had to shoulder all blame, for those luppo 
measures, despite their marring features, ac- Yuan 
complished certain aims which Terauchi him- iortif 
self would have been called upon to accom- imperil' 
plish, had they been left unattained by was c 
Okuma. ;oon b 
After all has been said in favor of Okuma, anxiot 
the fact remains that his Chinese policy has Engla 
created a situation which needs to be mended View ~ 
by his successor. It is to this task of ameliora- ~hine 
tion that Terauchi has been invited to address :1me 1 
.himself. And the new policy which Terau- W b 
chi has inaugurated in response to this call is dipl?~ 
a policy of "non-interference." Translated adv1s9 
into President Wilson's striking language, ;ituati 
Terauchi's policy in China is "watchful wait- that J 
ing." in col 
True to its professed intentions, the pres- The ~ 
ent cabinet has long since withdrawn eral ~ 
J apa!'lese troops from Cheng-Chia-tien. It is gentl~ 
even rumored that Terauchi is contemplating Hung 
the removal of Japanese soldiers from Han- Thus 
kow, where they have been stationed ever China 
since the first Chinese revolution of 1911. As i 
But the most noteworthy evidence of this off tn 
non-interference policy is the attitude con• ernme 
sistently taken by Count Terauchi and his the 4 
Foreign Minister, Baron Motono, in the throui 
political crisis in China apparently occa- at one 
sioned by the question of · China's participa- vice t1 
tion in the European war. ance 
China 
CHINA'S PARTICIPATION IN THE WAR ing w . 
This last-named war question is, of course, had a] 
quite• independent of the question of what to hav 
governmental form China should adopt. But ther St 
in China all foreign questions are, to the bility 
jeopardy of the nation's welfare, ruthlessly the in 
exploited by opposing factions for the ports 
manipulation of internal politics. Viewed in presse4 
this light, the powers would have done well dema11 
to advise China to let the war question alone. 
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nable even to take care of her own affairs, 
..,hina is in no position to tamper with such 
\uestions. I fail to understand those Ameri-
ns who are very boastful of their successful 
fforts to induce China to sever diplomatic 
lations with Germany. Do they not know 
at they were playing with fire which might 
nsume China's own tottering structure? 
To clear the atmosphere befogged by indis-
,riminate writings, it is essential to under-
and Japan's position with regard to Chi-
ese participation in the war. It w'as in 1915, 
hen Yuan Shih-kai was still enjoying dicta-
:orial power, that the idea of drawing China 
jnto the war was broached by England. At 
hat moment Japan could not see her way to 
upport the idea, for the obvious reason that 
uan was eager to go to war merely to 
ortify his own position as a step towards the 
imperial throne he had been coveting. Japan 
as convinced that Yuan's accession would 
oon be followed by more rebellions, and was 
anxious to prevent such a consummation. 
ngland herself eventually adopted the same 
iew of the situation, and the matter of 
hinese participation in the war was for the 
ime dropped. 
When in March last America severed 
diplomatic intercourse with Germany and 
advised China to follow suit, the political 
situation in China had so radically changed 
that Japan was now willing to let China act 
in consonance with the American advice. 
The dictatorial Yuan had been dead for sev-
eral months, and in his place an amicable 
entleman in the person of General Li Yuan-
Hung was occupying the presidential chair. 
Thus Japan's main reason for objecting to 
China's taking part in the war· was removed. 
As soon as America advised China to break 
off treaty relations with Germany, the gov-
ernment at Peking asked Japan's opinion on 
the question. The Terauchi Cabinet, 
through Foreign Minister Motono, replied 
at once that it was reluctant to give any ad-
vice that might be interpreted as an interfer-
ance with China's own affairs, but that 
China would perhaps lose nothing in break-
ing with Germany, especially when America 
had already taken that course and was eager 
to have China line up with her. China fur-
ther sought Japan's opinion as to the advisa-
bility of asking the consent of the powers to 
the increase of the customs tariff on the im-
ports to China. In reply to this Japan ex-
pressed herself ready to accede to such a 
demand, provided, of course, other powers 
Oct.- 6 
would act likewise. I have reason to believe 
that Japan even suggested that China at once 
notify the powers with a view to securing the 
desired revision of the tariff. 
Such has been Japan's unequivocal atti-
tude towards China's war question. He 
speaks ill-advisedly who tells Americans that 
China hesitated to follow the example set by 
the United States and close the doors against 
Germany because she was fearful of Japan's 
objection to such a step. 
Both the American and the Japanese 
press have discussed with a great deal of 
animation the American note presented to 
China on June 7, urging upon President Li 
Yuan-hung the necessity of establishing a 
government capable of restoring peace and 
order before China could decide upon war. 
I am inclined to believe that Japan will not 
long be permitted to follow a policy of non-
interference in China. If the chaotic situa-
tion in China persists, even after the ter-
mination of the European war, other powers 
are certain to intervene, or at least clamor for 
the restoration of order. The American ad-
vice to China given in March and June has 
already sounded a warning in the ears of the 
Japanese. Should European nations, after 
the war, each essay to take a hand in Chinese 
affairs, might not Japan also be obliged to 
deviate from her present policy? 
REPUBLIC OR MONARCHY IN CHINA? 
That a stable government will not easily 
be established in China goes without saying. 
The political chaos will not end with the 
fiasco created by General Chang Hsun's 
fatuous attempt to resuscitate the Manchu 
dynasty dead for six years. What will be 
China's ultimate form of government no one 
can tell. Such influential men as Tuan 
Chi-Jui, Hsu Shi-Chang, and Feng Kuo-
Chang no doubt see in a constitutional mon-
archy the best form of government for China, 
but even they realize that the Manchu 
dynasty cannot be restored. Where, then, 
shall they loo~ for the imperial timber? On 
the other hand, Sun Yat-Sen and his South-
ern associates believe in out-and-out republi-
canism, which will never be accepted by the 
orthern leaders. 
To an unbiased observer, it would seem 
that China's only hope for rehabilitation lay 
in mutual concessions on the part of the radi-
cal South and the conservative North, thus 
finding a common ground upon which to 
establish a government. 
BENEFITS TO CHIN A 
By CHARLES SUMNER LOBINGIER 
(Judge of the United States Court for China) 
PARTICIPATION in the war was a subject of controversy in China long be-
fore it was actually undertaken, and indeed 
was one of the causes leading to the crisis 
which incidentally made possible the short-
lived Manchu restoration of last July. Those 
who favored such participation argued that 
it would give China a recognized place at the 
peace conference and enable her to secure 
two important and long-sought concessions, 
vi.: ( 1 ) the remission, or at least suspension, 
of the so-called "Boxer" indemnities, and 
(2) a substantial increase of customs duties. 
As to -the first, our own Government long 
ago recognized the justice of the claim by 
remitting its entire share of the Boxer in-
demnity; and this was done not as a mere 
act of generosity, but as one of justice. In 
other words, our representatives became con-
vinced after investigation that the sum ex-
acted from China by the powers in 1900 was 
more than reimbursement for losses actually 
suffered by them, and amounted to a fine 
imposed upon a then helpless nation. 
As to the second concession sought, it will 
no doubt surprise the ordinary reader to 
learn that China must obtain the consent 
of the Powers in order to increase her cus-
toms duties. This is because that branch 
of her public service, while technically 
Chinese, is really administered by foreigners 
(i. e., non-Chinese) in order to insure pay-
ment of interest on China's foreign loans. 
Indeed, it would hardly be inaccurate to 
say that the Chinese customs service is a 
creation of foreigners. The late Sir Robert 
Hart devoted his life to it; and while the 
treaties require that the Inspector General 
shall be a British subject for some years to 
come, representatives of other nationalities, 
including our own, have contributed mate-
rially to its upbuilding and successful admin-
istration. Men like Morse and Merrill, now 
retired, as well as Carl and Bryant, still in 
the harness, have worthily represented our 
country in a branch of China's governmental 
service which has been honestly arid efficiently 
administered, and which, with the "Salt Ga-
belle," or monopoly, similarly operated, af-
418 
fords an important, if not the principal, 
source of China's public revenues. 
But the control of the Powers extends 
to the fixing of the amount of duty, and at 
present this is only 5 per cerit. Considering 
that the gravest obstacles of the Chinese gov-
ernment in recent years have been financial 
ones, it is not strange that its officials have 
looked to the customs as a source of relief 
and have regarded the present limitation as 
not only entirely too low, but as framed in 
the interests of foreign exporters rather than 
in those of the Chinese people. Moreover, 
those foreign representatives who have been 
most insistent up01. retaining the so-called 
indemnity are also the ones who oppose an 
increase of duties; and to the Chinese, it 
seems the extreme of injustice to be forced on 
the one hand to pay these heavy exactions and 
on the other to be denied the full benefit of a 
legitimate source of revenue to meet them. 
As to · these points, therefore, China's case 
appears to be entirely just and reasonable 
and at the same time quite in line with tradi-
tional American policy. To what extent 
she will participate actively in the war which 
she has now voluntarily entered remains to 
be seen; but it is not unlikely that her most 
effective contribution will be labor. I may 
cite as ari earnest of this the fact that the 
ship which brought me recently from China 
to America carried nearly a thousand Chinese 
laborers for the western front, entraining at 
Vancouver for the rail trip across Canada 
and thence transsshipirig to France. Large-
limbed and brawny, these coolies were the 
pick of Shantung Province; and it is safe 
to say that for trench digging and all the 
heaviest work of warfare each is better fitted 
than the average soldier. It is interesting 
to note also that the plan works well for 
the coolie, affording him better wages, food, 
and clothing than he would have at home 
and insuring provision likewise for his fam-
ily in China. This augmentation of Allied 
resources has now been in progress for months 
and may prove a not inconsiderable factor 
toward that victorious outcome of the 
for which .we of America are hoping. 
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